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Researchers and clinicians in the field of psychology 
have be.en constructing, investigating, and utilizing 
self-report measures of personality and psychopathology 
since the 1920's. Benefits of individually administered 
personality inventories include accessing important 
therapeutic information quickly and inexpensively. 
Self-report inventories are also widely used for personnel 
selection and for the assessment of individuals' 
qualifications to receive disability benefits. Because of 
the importance of obtaining valid information from the 
assessment process, several validity indices have been 
developed and included in many of the questionnaires to 
control for the effects of individuals' efforts to distort 
their test results. Some of these indices are targeted at 
detecting exaggerated profiles, where the individual 
deliberately attempts to over-report psychopathology. Other 
indices are developed to detect under-reporting. Yet others 
detect random responding, or the tendency to respond in a 
socially appropriate manner. 
The usefulness of an inventory often depends on its 
resistance or ability to detect faking. However, few tests 
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have been successful in resisting attempts at faking, or 
flawlessly detecting faking, when it occurs. One reason for 
this apparent limitation may be that researchers in the area 
of personality assessment have concentrated on developing a 
theoretical faking-resistant inventories and have ignored 
the process of how individuals fake. Further, if the faking 
process itself is understood, and differences between the 
response styles of individuals with intent to deceive and 
those that respond honestly are detectable, universal faking 
indicators may be identified (Holden, Kroner, Fekken, and 
Popham, 1992). One response process variable that is 
currently under investigation by several researchers is the 
response latency difference between honest responders and 
responders who are instructed to fake (e.g., Holden et al., 
1992). 
A subject's response latency on an inventory item is 
the time that elapses between the presentation of a stimulus 
and the response to that item. A computer is utilized to 
keep track of the elapsed time. The computer administration 
of personality inventories has become increasingly viable 
and popular (Space, 1981). Even though computerized versus 
conventional administration has not been found to be 
universally equivalent (Honaker, 1987), computer 
administration is becoming quite common. In addition to 
being more appealing to test-takers because of the increased 
speed of completing a questionnaire, response latency 
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recording is possible with the aid of ,the computer (Butcher, 
Keller, & Bacon, 1985; Space, 1981). 
Investigators have only recently begun to explore the 
link between faking and response latencies on personality 
inventories. Evidence is accumulating showing that 
respondents behave differently when they fake their 
responses versus when they take the test honestly (as 
detected by their latencies). Existing response process 
theories (e.g., Rogers, 1977; Kuncel, 1973; Kuiper, 1981) 
are being applied by some investigators (Hsu, Santelli, & 
Hsu, 1989) and elaborated on by others (Holden, et al., 
1992) to explain these differences. Further research is 
needed to fully understand how individuals' attempts to 
distort their responses affect their response latencies. 
The present study will investigate the relationship 
between response latencies and personality inventory 
responding. Response process theories will be examined to 
better understand how individuals behave on self-report 
instruments. Further, how may their behaviors change due to 
motivational factors (e.g., motivation to fake bad or fake 
good)? 
The Model 
As discussed above, a new model of faking (Holden et 
al., 1992) has been proposed that predicts response latency 
differences based on the congruence between an item and an 
individual's schema. Evidence is accumulating supporting 
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its theoretical implications (Holden & Kroner, 1992; Holden 
et al., 1992; Brunetti, 1994). However, thorough 
investigation is needed to further assess the universality 
and generality of this model, and to gain further knowledge 
of its applicability to various settings and with various 
populations. Particularly, the response latency 
expectations in a normal population are most probably 
different from those found in psychologically disturbed 
populations. The possible pattern and response latency 
differences thus call for further exploration and 
clarification. 
Statement Of The Problem 
Researchers in the area of assessment want to construct 
better, more reliable self-report inventories, or find ways 
to make the existing inventories even more reliable. In 
this particular domain, we can draw on the wealth of 
research that has already been conducted by cognitive 
psychologists to understand the mechanism of human 
responding, and apply those concepts to gain an 
understanding of the process of faking. However, this 
understanding is only beginning to take form and research in 
this area is in its infancy. The few studies published have 
both suffered from (e.g., Hsu et al., 1989) and focused on 
reducing (e.g., Holden, & Kroner, 1992) methodological 
problems typical of the explorations in any new area. For 
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example, when making inferences about the psychological 
meaning of response latency differences, eliminating 
psychologically unrelated explanations, like the length of 
the item and item ambiguity, is extremely important (Rogers, 
1977; Dunn, et al., 1972). 
Whether to utilize a single versus a double 
standardization procedure constitutes an important 
methodological consideration. Holden and his colleagues at 
the Queen's University have consistently used a double 
standardization procedure to control for both item 
characteristics (e.g.,item length and ambiguity) and subject 
characteristics (e.g., reading speed). When .item latencies 
are standardized, first, in relation to a norm group's 
latencies (i.e., to control for item characteristics), and 
second, for each subject's latencies on each item (i.e., 
subject characteristics), the resulting ~-score 
transformation yields a mean latency of O and a standard 
deviation of 1 for each subject and for the items across all 
groups. Only within-inventory shifts, where one subscale 
takes longer to respond to relative to another, can be 
identified. The goals of the studies conducted by Holden 
and his colleagues have been to investigate relative latency 
differences between high scale-scoring subjects and low 
scale-scoring subjects (e.g.,Popham and Holden, 1990) and 
relative latency differences between subjects instructed to 
fake-bad, fake-good, or answer honestly. 
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On the other hand, Brunetti (1994) utilized a single 
standardization procedure (i.e., only item characteristics 
were statistically controlled for). A double 
standardization procedure was not used because absolute 
latency differences across the 370 items for the three 
instructional groups were of experimental interest. 
As mentioned above, when statistically adjusting for 
subject characteristics, individual differences can not 
easily be identified. Only relative scale differences are 
subject to recognition. In the present study, 
identification of individual response latency differences is 
vital when seeking to answer the experimental questions 
posed (see below). Thus, a single standardization procedure 
was utilized to yield absolute as well as relative response 
latency differences. 
Another methodological issue that has been allotted 
considerable attention is the concept of item ambiguity. 
Cairns and Hsu (1980) found that when ambiguity was 
eliminated by providing a biasing context for lexically 
ambiguous items, latency delays disappeared. The ambiguity 
of an inventory item was found to increase response 
latencies in a study of "difficult" and "standard'' items on 
the MMPI (Hanley, 1962). Even though the degree of 
difficulty of responding to a given item may vary from 
individual to individual, ambiguity regarding the underlying 
meaning of an item can be reduced by making the item 
content-relevant (e.g., Turner & Fiske, 1968; Goldberg, 
1963). 
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Also, whether the respondent is rejecting or accepting 
an item should be considered when grouping response 
latencies for analysis. Investigators have found that the 
decision to endorse or reject an item is closely related to 
the schema the subject is operating from (Popham & Holden, 
1990, Holden et al., 1992). 
Statement of Hypotheses 
This research project explored the link between 
response latencies and faking from the perspective and 
framework of schema theory. Latencies for individuals with 
scale-elevations (i.e., .'.J'. > 64) were compared to latencies 
for individuals with no scale elevations on the MMPI-2. 
Specifically, how these groups' latencies differed under 
honest, fake-bad, and fake-good instructions were explored. 
It was hypothesized that (a) individuals with MMPI-2 scale 
elevations would endorse items more quickly and reject items 
more slowly when taking the test honestly compared to 
individuals with no scale elevations. It was expected that 
the effect would be seen on the f scale, clinical scales 
1-4, 6-9, and the obvious subscales. (Hypothesized 
differences on scales 5 and O were not made due to the 
conventional practice of excluding these scales as measures 
of psychopathology). The opposite pattern was expected for 
the~ and~ scales. It was also hypothesized that (b) 
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latency differences would be found on basic scales as well 
as subtle/obvious subscales between individuals without and 
those with MMPI-2 scale elevations under faking conditions 
(i.e., the groups would differ in their attempts to 
dissimulate as manifested by their latencies). Furthermore, 
it was hypothesized that (c) individuals with MMPI-2 scale 
elevations would endorse items more quickly and reject items 
more slowly on the specific scales that were elevated as 
compared to their latencies on those scales without 
elevations after taking the test honestly. This hypothesis 
pertains only to scales 1-4, 6-9, and the obvious subscales. 
Hypothesis bis stated in non-directional terms because 
of the limited data available. It was uncertain how the 
response latencies of subjects with elevations would be 
affected by instructions to fake when they presumably 
already have a psychopathology self-schema. Hypotheses a 
and c do not include subtle subscales when making 
directional predictions. It was unclear how ambiguous items 
affect latencies. Therefore, even though specific 
hypotheses are not stated for the subtle items, the 
exploration of their latency effects are an important aspect 
of this study. Because the between-group differences are of 
main experimental interest, no within-group hypotheses were 
postulated. 
Before running the main analyses discussed above, 
preliminary analyses were run to determine how the 
instructions as well as group differences affected the 
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MMPI-2 basic T-scores. The T-score hypotheses were as 
follows: 1) subjects in the elevated group were expected to 
produce higher T-scores than the subjects in the nonelevated 
group on MMPI-2 f scale, and clinical scales 1-4 and 6-9 in 
the honest condition, 2) between-group T-score differences 
were also expected for basic scales in the fake-good and 
fake-bad conditions. However, the directionality of these 
differences was not hypothesized because so little is known 
about how group membership influences faking, and 3) 
subjects in both the elevated and the nonelevated groups 
were expected to produce lower T-scores when faking good and 
higher T-scores when faking bad as compared to their honest 
responding on the K scale, and clinical scales 1-4 and 6-9. 
The opposite pattern was expected for the b scale, where 
subjects in both the elevated and the nonelevated groups 
were expected to produce higher 1 scale T-scores when faking 
good as compared to the honest condition. 
CHAPTER II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Stage Models 
Psycholinguists and researchers investigating cognitive 
operations have proposed several stage models of human 
reaction time. These models have focused on isolating 
individual steps in the response process, thus opening the 
way for fu.rther examination. of independent stages ( Spoehr & 
Lehmkuhle, 1982). Understanding human information-
processing when investigating response latencies in any area 
is of utmost importance. Particularly, making inferences 
due to motivational factors is possible only as long as 
extraneous factors are controlled. The stage models provide 
an opportunity for researchers to identify the different 
components and factors that come into play when.responding 
to personality inventory items. 
Danders' (1868) Subtraction Model 
Because of the speed of human information processing, 
and because individual stages often cannot be performed in 
isolation, Donders (1868, [1969]) proposed the Subtraction 
method to estimate the amount of time necessary to execute a 
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given stage. In this procedure, the subject performs the 
task twice, once including the target stage and once 
excluding the stage. The researcher then subtracts one from 
the other to compute reaction time. For example, when 
estimating the time it takes to eat the main course during a 
meal, record the time it takes to eat the meal with and 
without the main course. Then subtract response latency of 
the exclusive meal (i.e., without the main course) from the 
inclusive meal (i.e., with the main course) to obtain main 
course reaction time. 
Sternberg's (1969) Additive Stage Model 
One of the difficulties with Donders' model is that he 
did not account for the influence that adding one stage has 
on the reaction time (RT) of the other stages. Returning to 
the meal example, eating a main course is definitely going 
to influence the amount of dessert one eats; thus, reaction 
times for each stage are interdependent and unstable. 
Sternberg (1969) expanded on Donders' model by identifying 
the non-interactive stages in a response process when the 
stages are held constant. Reaction times are analyzed by 
the cumulative adding of additional items to the stage in 
question. This procedure is called the Additive Stage 
method. Experiments utilizing a binary-classification task 
illustrated his ideas. He had subjects engage in numerical 
comparisons subsequent to memorizing sets of digits. A 
positive response is made by the subject if the test digit 
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is a member of the previously presented set of digits (i.e., 
the subject is able to correctly remember a digit when 
subsequently presented in a set of digits). Sternberg found 
that adding items to the set had a stable incremental (i.e., 
linear) effect on RT regardless of the size of the set. 
Rogers' (1974a) Three-Stage Model 
Extending the Additive Stage model to explain the 
process of responding to personality items, Rogers (1974a) 
postulated the presence of three stages: 1) Stimulus 
Encoding (Item length), 2) Stimulus Comprehension (Item 
ambiguity), and 3) Binary Decision (Item controversiality). 
Thirty university student volunteers responded to 200 
personality items of varying length, ambiguity, and 
controversiality. Ambiguity was assessed along a 5-point 
rating scale and items were classified as either high (i.e., 
with a 2.52 average rating) or low (i.e., with a 1.88 
average rating) in ambiguity. Further, an item was deemed 
controversial if the proportion of "true" responses to the 
item was around 0.5. For each subject, the mean RT for 
items of varying length, controversiality, and ambiguity was 
subjected to analyses of variance with repeated measures on 
each variable (e.i., three ANOVA's analyzed the 
relationships between, and main effects of, the three 
proposed stages). The results showed that the three stages 
are additive with respect to reaction time, with no 
interaction effects and consistent main effects. 
13 
Conclusion 
Moving from the Additive Stage model developed to 
explain human reaction times to the model proposed by Rogers 
specifically addressing the process of inventory item 
responding has made it possible to examine each factor that 
influences item response latencies in isolation. These 
factors (i.e., item length, item ambiguity, item 
controversiality) will be discussed below, starting with 
item controversiality, the component influenced by 
motivation. 
The Binary Decision Stage 
Rogers (1974b) extended his work by focusing on the 
Binary Decision stage (item controversiality). This stage 
is of major interest for personality assessment, because 
factors leading to individual differences (e.g., intent to 
deceive, response styles, and response sets) as well as item 
position play a much stronger role at this stage than the 
other stages. 
Rogers (1974b) separated the Binary Decision stage into 
two component stages, the Self-Referent Decision (SRD) and 
the Response Selection. The subjects in his study were 24 
introductory psychology students. Classifying 
controversiality as either high or low, Rogers found that 
the number of response alternatives (2 or 5) did not 
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interact with controversiality. He therefore concluded that 
the proposed substages (i.e., the SRD and the Response 
Selection) were independent of each other. Only the SRD is 
influenced by item controversiality. 
The Self-Referent Decision 
This is the stage where an individual compares the item 
at hand to information stored in memory. When the decision 
involves the self (i.e., when the person has to decide 
whether or not the item applies to him/herself), reaction 
times are manifestations of the controversiality of the item 
(i.e., the congruence between the person and the item; 
Rogers, 1974b). Motivational factors, such as the intent to 
deceive, influence and may alter the process of responding 
at this stage. 
The Response Selection 
This stage is influenced by the response format of the 
inventory (e.g., true-false, likert-type scale), and occurs 
subsequent to decision-making. For example, when a 
respondent decides that an item is representative of 
him/herself, the true or mostly true response option will be 
selected. Even though between-inventory variations may 
occur (i.e., reaction time difference between a test with 
few response options versus one with many), within-inventory 
variability is minimal and reaction time remains stable. 
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Conclusion 
Because the response selection stage of a given 
inventory has a constant effect on reaction time, only the 
SRD and item controversiality will be subjected to further 
examination. Kuiper (1981) proposed that the SRD is a 
process by which a schema about the "self" has been 
activated. This leads to an exploration of schema theory, a 
theory that has received a lot of attention and recognition 
in personality research. 
Schema Theory 
Responding to personality inventories involves 
accessing information in memory referred to as the 
"self-schema" (Kuiper, 1981). Biederman (1981) defined a 
schema as "an overall representation [in memory] that serves 
to integrate all the separate aspects of the [construct]" 
(p. 169). Self-schema or schemata is defined by Markus 
(1977) as the "cognitive generalizations about the self, 
derived from past experiences, that organize and guide the 
processing of self-related information" (p. 63). 
Self-schema and SRD 
Rogers (1977) proposed that when making self-referent 
decisions, an elaborate memory structure is activated, 
referred to by Markus (1977) as a self-schema. He 
investigated the effectiveness of accessing this memory 
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structure. Subjects were presented with either first- or 
third-person items and instructed to reference the "self" or 
given no instructions. On a subsequent recognition task, 
subjects who completed the first-person questionnaire and 
were instructed to make a self-referenced decision, made the 
least number of recognition errors compared to subjects who 
answered a third-person questionnaire and were given no 
instructions to access the "self." The investigator, in a 
related experiment, also found that individuals 
automatically reference their self-schema when responding to 
first-person personality items. He further concluded that 
accessing a self-schema appears to involve deeper and more 
elaborate processing. 
Self-Schema and response latencies 
Because individuals process information differently 
when they access a self-schema compared to when they do not, 
several investigators have explored the link between schema 
theory and its effect on latencies. Rogers, Kuiper and 
Kirker (1977) found that subjects who engaged in 
self-referenced tasks took longer to respond than subjects 
who completed a semantic task that involved more shallow 
levels of processing. Subjects in their study rated 40 
adjectives in one of four experimental tasks. Each task 
forced varying degrees of encoding (i.e., structural, 
phonemic, semantic, and self-referenced). In addition to 
producing longer latencies, the adjectives in the 
self-referenced task were recalled better. 
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However, Markus (1977) found accessing a self-schema 
facilitated the endorsement of schema-relevant items. He 
grouped subjects based on how "independent" or "dependent" 
they rated themselves and subsequently presented lists of 
trait adjectives associated with independence and 
dependence. The subjects were significantly quicker in 
responding to items that were consistent with their 
self-schema than items that were not. For example, both 
"dependents" and "independents" rated themselves as 
independent, ambitious, and individualistic. However, it 
took the "dependents" significantly longer to respond to 
these adjectives. 
Conclusion 
Whether accessing a self-schema facilitates or prolongs 
the process of responding is at this point inconclusive 
(Rogers, 1974b; Markus, 1977). However, response latencies 
during the SRD are doubtlessly influenced by having subjects 
access a self-schema. Another factor that has an effect on 
response latencies at this stage is the congruence between a 
subject's schema and the item at hand (i.e., item 
controversiality). This discussion will now focus on how 
both subject position (i.e., the test-taker's personal view 
of the item content) and item position (i.e., how 
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controversial the item content is to the subject), as well 
as ambiguity as an item property, influence responding. 
More on Controversiality, and Ambiguity 
Returning to Rogers' (1974a) three-stage model, the 
second stage he found to be additive with respect to 
reaction time is the comprehensiveness or ambiguity of 
inventory items. The more ambiguous a test item is, the 
longer the response latency. Further, when the longer 
latency is attributable to test characteristics, individual 
variations are concealed. Thus, if inferences are to be 
made about individual or group differences, the influence of 
item ambiguity on latencies needs to be addressed. 
Even though Rogers (1974a) found item controversiality 
and item ambiguity to be additive with respect to reaction 
time, few investigators have separated subject traits (e.g., 
motivation, or degree of psychological disturbance) and 
subject position from item characteristics when examining 
item ambiguity. Following a general discussion of subject 
versus item position, ambiguity and test stability, an 
argument will be made for how item position influences 
latencies at the Binary Decision stage (Rogers, 1974b), 
whereas ambiguity is an extraneous factor at this stage. 
Item position versus subject position 
Kuiper (1981) investigated reaction time during a 
self-referenced task and found that adjectives that were 
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judged as extremely like or extremely unlike the self were 
responded to much quicker than adjectives that were only 
moderately descriptive. Thus, both the characteristics of 
the subject and the position of the item exert influence 
upon latencies. 
Kuncel (1973) scaled both subjects and items along the 
same dimension and proposed that the closer the item is to 
the respondents' threshold, the longer the response latency. 
The subjects identified their item position prior to 
answering personality inventory items. The threshold was 
defined as the point where the respondent is equally likely 
to respond false ass/he is to respond true. She gave the 
following example of her model: 
Consider a subject who is asked to respond 
to a series of items concerning the age at which 
citizens should be permitted to vote-"at lO?""at 
11?" up to "at 29?" "at 30?" For items dealing 
with ages from 10 to 15 and from 25 to 30, the 
answers for the typical subject are quite clear, 
and the reasoning is virtually spontaneous. 
Around ages 18 to 21, however, he has to weigh 
carefully a number of factors, such as the 
importance of the vote and the average maturity 
level of each age group. The "nearer" the items 
are to the subject's approximate position on the 
issue, the harder it is for him to make a 
decision, [and] the more carefully he must weigh 
the alternatives. (pp.545-546) 
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The investigator also found that as the subjects approached 
their threshold, inappropriate response strategies (e.g., 
random responding) were applied. 
Stability 
Turner and Fiske (1968) also found that test 
respondents frequently engage in inappropriate response 
processes, and that homogeneity of items, as it relates to 
the construct validity of the test, is an important aspect 
of assuring item and test quality. Fiske's (1968) model of 
inventory responding is similar to Kuncel's theory in that 
he argued that the stability of a response is related to the 
absolute distance between the item point and the person 
point. He argued that a response tends to be more stable 
when it is made by a person whose point is more distant from 
the item point. When a person encounters an item, the 
interactive process depends upon both the item and the 
person. 
Goldberg (1963) proposed that the stability of any item 
depends upon both the narrowness of the position of the item 
and the extremeness of the item on an attribute continuum. 
Instability exists when the perceived position of the item 
varies from subject to subject. He also argued there is 
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more hesitation in answering and less test-retest stability 
when the item is considered ambiguous. 
Conclusion 
The purpose of the above discussion was twofold. 
First, it introduced item position as an important aspect of 
making self-referenced decisions, thus expanding the 
self-schema framework. Second, it explored both item 
controversiality and item ambiguity as factors that 
influence the process of responding. Implications for 
response latency research are that instability due to item 
controversiality affects latencies at the Binary Decision 
stage, whereas instability due to item ambiguity has an 
effect on latencies at the Stimulus Comprehension stage 
(Rogers, 1974b). 
Research on stability at the Binary Decision stage has 
shown that there is a point where responding is unstable 
(i.e., when both the person and the item are close to a 
threshold; Turner, & Fiske, 1968). A major factor that 
influences latencies at this stage is the traits and 
characteristics the test-taker references when deciding on 
the congruence between the item and the schema. 
At the Stimulus Comprehension stage, the stability of a 
response is influenced by item ambiguity. In contrast to 
controversiality, which involves subject and item position, 
item ambiguity refers to the meaning of the item itself. 
Response latencies attributable to this stage are 
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independent of those that accrue at the Binary Decision 
stage (Rogers, 1974b). Further, this is where the subject 
is attempting to gain an understanding of the items/he is 
responding to without necessarily accessing information 
about the self. Ambiguity can be reduced by utilizing and 
developing content-relevant tests (Turner & Fiske, 1968), 
which in turn may improve the predictive power of latencies. 
Item Length 
The first stage in Rogers' (1974b) model addresses item 
length. Dunn, Lushene and O'Neil, Jr. (1972) found that 
item length alone accounted for 47% to 58% of the response 
latency variance on the MMPI. In order to control for this 
effect, statistical methods have been applied. When 
investigating the ability of response latency differences to 
assess psychopathology, Holden, Fekken and Cotton (1991) 
came up with a standardization procedure to statistically 
control for item length, as well as item ambiguity, order of 
presentation, vocabulary level, gender, and reading speed. 
This procedure will be discussed later. 
Conclusions 
The above review of information-processing literature 
pertaining to reaction time has provided a frame-work for 
further exploration (i.e., schema-theory), as well as 
brought to awareness several issues (e.g., item ambiguity, 
item length) one needs to control for when researching 
response latencies. Keeping this information in mind, a 
review of the literature that seeks to predict individual 
response latency differences follows. 
Prediction Models 
Under Standard Instructions 
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Response latency research has recently been extended to 
the field of assessment (e.g., Popham & Holden, 1990; Fekken 
& Holden, 1992). Response latencies are believed to be the 
behavioral manifestations of the response process (Rogers, 
1971). Therefore, investigating individual differences in 
response latencies as possible predictors of personality 
dimensions were the focus of Popham and Holden's (1990) 
study. Subject position (high versus low) on the MMPI 
content-based scales (Costa, Zonderman, Williams, & Mccrae, 
1985), as well as the traditional clinical scales, were 
compared to scale-specific response latencies for 
psychopathologically endorsed and rejected items. Each 
subject's position was based on the total scale score. 
Compared to subjects scoring low on a scale, subjects 
scoring high on a given scale were found (a) to produce 
shorter response latencies when endorsing items on that 
scale, and (b) to produce longer response latencies when 
rejecting items on the same scale. The investigators 
concluded that these findings supported a self-schema model 
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of responding to personality inventory items in that 
incoming information is compared to a relevant self-schema. 
The schema-relevant items are quickly endorsed, and slowly 
rejected. This was found to be true for the content-based 
scales only {Costa et al., 1985). The traditional, clinical 
scales did not correlate with response latencies in a 
similar pattern. The clinical scales on the MMPI consist of 
both subtle {content-irrelevant) and obvious 
{content-relevant) items. Inappropriate response strategies 
{Kuncel, 1973) may have been used when answering the more 
ambiguous subtle items. This lends support to Turner and 
Fiske's {1968) argument that homogeneity of items to test 
construct (e.g., psychopathology) is important to consider 
when response latencies are measured. 
Another important question raised by the Popham and 
Holden {1990) study is the possible ability to predict a 
person's relative standing on a given dimension by his or 
her response latencies on that dimension. Holden, Fekken, 
and Cotton (1991) set out to examine the relationship 
between response latencies and scale scores on the Basic 
Personality Inventory {BPI; Jackson, 1986) utilizing both 
college student and psychiatric patients as subjects. They 
found that subjects who scored high on the dimension 
measured by a given scale obtained significantly shorter 
response latencies on items for that scale as compared to 
subjects with no elevations. Their findings generalized 
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across different scales and factors, and again indicate that 
the presence of a self-schema facilitates processing. 
Fekken and Holden (1992) continued to investigate the 
relationship between response latencies, personality 
inventory responding and schema theory. They proposed that 
when individuals respond to personality tests, their 
response pattern is a manifestation of internal traits. The 
objective of their study was to show that, in spite of 
theoretical differences, personality traits and self-schema 
can be combined into a single framework. The traditional 
theoretical differences consist of traits being scaled along 
a dimension (degree of presence), while a self-schema is 
conceptualized dichotomously (either/or). During the first 
part of their study, utilizing 105 university students as 
subjects, they demonstrated that positions on various 
dimensions of psychopathology (i.e., high versus medium 
versus low scores on the BPI scales) determined 
scale-specific response latencies. High-scoring subjects 
endorsed items significantly more quickly on that scale, 
while rejecting items significantly more slowly when 
compared to low-scoring subjects. During the second part of 
their study, utilizing 55 undergraduates as subjects, the 
subjects' self-schema was determined by self-ratings on 
pairs of adjectives related to each of the content 
dimensions on the Personality Research Form (PRF; Jackson, 
1984). A significant relationship was found between 
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adjective self-ratings and scores on the corresponding PRF 
scale, thus supporting their proposition that the presence 
of a trait as measured by an inventory also signals the 
presence of a self-schema. 
Summary 
The development of schema-related theories (Markus, 
1977; Rogers, 1971) and postulates concerning person versus 
item position in regard to stability (Fiske, 1968) and 
reaction time (Kuiper, 1981) have led to new discoveries in 
the area of personality assessment. Researchers are now 
applying a theoretical framework to explain the process 
individuals engage in when responding to personality 
inventory items. The individual compares personality items 
to his/her self-schema. If a given item is 
schema-congruent, rejecting the item becomes a slower 
process than accepting the item. Additionally, if the 
person feels strongly that something is true or false as 
related to the "self" (person position) and the item at hand 
either strongly describes or does not describe the person 
(item position), then the response latency for endorsing the 
item is shorter than when the two positions are less extreme 
(i.e., closer to the threshold). Several investigators have 
also applied response latency theories to explain the 
process of faking (Hsu et al., 1989; Holden & Kroner, 1992; 
Holden et al., 1992; Brunetti, 1994). 
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Under Faking Instructions 
Hsu et al. (1989) investigated the faking-detection 
ability of reaction times to the MMPI. Undergraduates were 
assigned to groups with different instructional sets 
(honest, fake-good, and fake-bad). Raw item response 
latencies were computed for the Obvious and Subtle subscales 
(Christian, Burkhart, & Gynther, 1978) and averaged. The 
endorsement pattern was not grouped for analysis. The 
investigators found that subjects who were instructed to 
fake (both fake-good and fake-bad) consistently produced 
shorter response latencies than subjects who were given 
standard instructions. Even though the investigators 
concluded that their findings seemed consistent with several 
response process theories (i.e., Goldberg, 1963; Kuncel, 
1973; Rogers, 1971; Rogers et al., 1977; Nowakowska, 1970), 
no attempts were made to control for item ambiguity, item 
length, and other confounding variables. Holden et al. 
(1992) strongly criticized investigators for using raw 
response latencies, and for not analyzing the pattern of 
endorsement. 
Holden et al. (1992) elaborated their self-schema model 
for responding to personality inventory items to explain the 
process by which individuals fake. The model postulates 
that when subjects are instructed to fake, they adopt a 
"faking" schema that influences their responses as well as 
their speed of responding. The adopted-schema works like a 
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self-schema, in that schema-relevant items are quickly 
endorsed, and slowly rejected. Using university students as 
their subjects, results showed an interaction effect between 
faking and endorsement, thus supporting their adopted-schema 
model. The effect was found using the MMPI clinical and 
validity scale items as well as the items on the BPI. These 
results contradict Popham and Holden's (1990) study that 
failed to find an association between MMPI clinical scale 
items and response latencies. The investigators used a 
double-standardization procedure (Holden, Fekken, & Cotton, 
1991) to statistically control for item length, item 
ambiguity, order of presentation, vocabulary level, gender, 
and reading speed. This ~-score standardization procedure 
involves the adjustment of latency means and standard 
deviations across MMPI items for each subject, and within 
each MMPI item in the standard condition. Standardization 
across items for each subject corrects for confounding 
individual differences such as reading speed, while 
within-item standardization corrects for confounding 
stimulus characteristics such as item length. 
Holden and Kroner (1992) utilized maximum security 
prison inmates during their investigation of how well 
response latencies can differentiate among inmates who are 
instructed to dissimulate. They also compared the relative 
efficacy of differential response latencies to other faking 
indices. Eighty-seven subjects voluntarily completed the 
BPI under fake-good, fake-bad, and honest conditions. The 
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investigators found that differential response latencies can 
significantly discriminate between subjects who were given 
faking versus standard instructions. The results yielded an 
overall classification hit rate of 59.77%. Inmates who were 
faking good took longer to endorse psychopathological items 
as compared to inmates who were not faking good. Also, 
inmates who were faking bad took longer to reject 
psychopathological items than inmates in the other 
conditions. Further, subjects in both faking conditions 
took longer to reject items as compared to subjects in the 
honest condition. When looking at the correct 
classification rate of differential response latencies 
compared to other indices utilized on the BPI (i.e., the BPI 
denial scale, the BPI self-depreciation scale, the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale; Crowne & Marlowe, 
1960, the Edwards Social Desirability scale; Edwards, 1957) 
all scales were about equally successful (i.e., 
classification hit rates between 55.17% and 65.96%). 
Combining the four indices yielded a rate of 83.91%. Adding 
the differential response latency measure to these scales 
did not, however, yield statistical significance. The 
investigators utilized the ~-score standardization procedure 
discussed above before analyzing their results. 
Brunetti (1994) had introductory psychology students 
respond to a computerized version of the MMPI-2 (Butcher, 
Dahlstrom, Graham, Tellegen, & Kaemmer, 1989) under 
fake-good, fake-bad, and standard instructions. The MMPI-2 
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was deemed more appropriate than the MMPI, because of the 
general expectation that the revised and renormed version of 
this instrument will replace the old version. The focus of 
Brunetti's study was to examine the theories which relate 
faking and reaction time, and he proposed that more research 
is needed to establish what theory best fits the empirical 
findings. Similar to Holden et al. (1992), Brunetti found 
several methodological difficulties with the few empirical 
studies (e.g., Hsu et al., 1989) that have been published 
linking response latency differences to instructional sets 
(i.e., faking). In accordance with the groupings of Holden 
and his colleagues, Brunetti looked at the endorsement 
pattern of responding (i.e., the subject endorses an item 
when the "true" or "false" responding is scored for 
psychopathology, and rejects an item when the "true" or 
"false" responding is not scored for psychopathology). He 
also statistically controlled for item characteristics 
(e.g., item length) on the MMPI-2. However, a double 
standardization procedure was not used. Individual subject 
characteristics were controlled through random assignment of 
subjects to groups. The author further assumed homogeneity 
of reading speed in his college sample. In accordance with 
Hsu et al. (1989), Brunetti grouped latencies using subtle 
and obvious item distinctions. However, he used Wiener and 
Harmon's (1946) subtle and obvious ratings, not the less 
commonly used ratings of Christian, Burkhart and Gynther 
(1978) used by Hsu et al. (1989). 
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The results showed that for subjects faking bad, it 
took significantly less time to accept items from scales 
composed of many psychopathological items than it took to 
reject those items. Fake-bad subjects also spent more time 
accepting items that were positive or psychopathology-
unrelated (i.e., 1-scale items), with the opposite pattern 
being true for the honest and fake-good responders. These 
findings strongly support the previously discussed 
facilitory effects of accessing a self-schema as proposed by 
Markus (1977) and are in direct contradiction to the 
theoretical positions of Rogers (e.g., Rogers, Kuiper, & 
Kirker, 1977), who postulated that items which are 
representative of an individual would take longer to 
process. The subtle/obvious analysis revealed significant 
differences for the rejected items only. The fake-bad 
subjects took significantly longer to reject obvious items 
than the subtle items, with the opposite pattern being true 
for the fake-good group. These results also fit within 
the schema theory framework of Markus (1977). Because the 
subtle items are more socially desirable (Christian et al., 
1978), the subjects faking bad are more hesitant in 
endorsing these items, while the subjects faking-good are 
more willing to endorse these items. 
Summary 
Similar to the studies investigating latency 
differences under standard instructions, the four empirical 
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studies (Hsu et al., 1989; Holden et al., 1992, Holden & 
Kroner, 1992; Brunetti, 1994) investigating latency 
differences under faking instructions have all attempted to 
explain their results within a theoretical framework. The 
schema theory (Markus, 1977) appears to best fit the 
empirical data; subjects who are instructed to fake adopt a 
faking schema that serves as a reference for making 
decisions (Holden et al., 1992). Nevertheless, the faking 
detection ability of latencies does not seem to add any 
unique information over and above that already accounted for 
by various faking detection indices (Holden & Kroner, 1992). 
However, latency expectations for various populations need 
to be established before long or short latencies can be said 
to represent an abnormal indication of dissimulation. For 
example, a depressed individual who already has a 
"depressed" self-schema is expected to respond quicker than 
non-depressed individuals to items dealing with depression 
and may take longer before rejecting an item dealing with 
depression. The same individual may also have a harder time 
than non-depressed individuals in adopting a fake-good 
schema when responding to items drawing on depression. The 
studies conducted so far have not investigated the influence 
of pre-existing personality characteristics or 
psychopathology on adopting a schema. The moderate 
classification hit rate found in the Holden and Kroner 
(1992) study may therefore be due to having obtained 




Subjects were 48 undergraduate introductory psychology 
students (30 females, 18 males) from a state university in 
the Southwest United States. Two subjects were dropped from 
the study due to response latency exclusion criteria; they 
responded faster than .OSs to more than 50 items on any 
given MMPI - 2 administration (more details about the 
exclusion criteria are provided below). Participants were 
screened for psychopathology. All students scoring in the 
elevated range (i.e., T-score >62) and an equal number of 
students scoring in the normal range on a screening 
instrument (i.e., The Brief Symptom Inventory; Derogatis, 
1993) were contacted by an experimenter and asked to 
complete three MMPI-2 questionnaires. Volunteer student 
recruiting was continued until an equal number of subjects 
scored in both the elevated (T-score >64 on at least one of 
the clinical scales 1-4 and 6-9 only) and normal ranges on 
the MMPI-2, thus making up the two experimental conditions. 
Only MMPI-2 elevation, not BSI elevations, were considered 
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pertinent when making decisions about group membership. A 
proportional number of males and females (62.5% female, 
37.5% male) were included in each group. The subjects 
received one extra credit point per hour of participation. 
Instruments and Apparatus 
The Inventory 
One measure of personality and psychopathology that has 
been easy to computerize due to its format and limited 
response options (Butcher, Keller, & Bacon, 1985) is the 
Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI; Hathaway 
& Kinley, 1967). It is the most widely used personality 
questionnaire today (Murphy & Davidshofer, 1991). The MMPI 
has a number of validity indices associated with it to 
detect faked profiles (e.g.' .!!. ' f, and li) • 
Several studie.s have utilized the MMPI as their 
instrument of choice when studying response latencies (Hsu, 
et al., 1989; Holden et al., 1992; Dunn et al., 1972; Popham 
& Holden,· 1990). As discussed above, the MMPI.was recently 
revised and renormed (MMPI-2; Butcher et al., 1989). 
Because the MMPI-2 is expected to replace the original 
inventory, the revised version was utilized in this research 
project. 
The short form of the MMPI-2 (i.e., the first 370 
items) was administered, precluding the scoring of the 
content-based scales (Costa et al., 1985). However, 
35 
comparisons was made between the obvious and subtle 
subscales on the inventory, thus addressing the question of 
how content-relevant versus content-irrelevant items 
influences response latencies. 
The Brief Symptom Inventory 
The Brief Symptom Inventory (BSI; Derogatis, 1993), a 
53-item self-report inventory, is essentially the brief form 
of the Symptom Distress Checklist (SCL-90; Derogatis, 1977). 
Similar to the SCL-90, it is conceived as measuring 9 
primary symptom dimensions (i.e., Somatization (SOM), 
Obsessive-Compulsive (0-C), Interpersonal Sensitivity (I-S), 
Depression (DEP), Anxiety (ANX), Hostility (HOS), Phobic 
Anxiety (PHOB), Paranoid Ideation (PAR), and Psychoticism 
(PSY)). The BSI also measures three global indices of 
distress: 1) the General Severity Index (GSI), 2) the 
Positive Symptom Distress Index (PSDI), and 3) the Positive 
Symptom Total (PST). The normative samples include 1,002 
adult psychiatric outpatients, 423 adult psychiatric 
inpatients, and 974 adult non-patients. Internal 
consistency and test-retest reliability (i.e., Cronbach's 
coefficient alpha ranging from .68 to .90), as well as the 
validity of the BSI (i.e., high correlations with the SCL-90 
and the MMPI), appear adequate (Derogatis, & Melisaratos, 
1983). AT-score of 63 and above on the GSI was considered 
elevated. 
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality 
Inventory-2 (MMPI-2) 
The Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory - 2 
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(MMPI-2; Butcher, et al., 1989) was used when measuring item 
response latencies. T-scores and response latencies for the 
three validity scales (1, ~, li) and the ten clinical scales 
(Hs, Q, !!Y, Pd, Mf, Pa, Pt, Sc, Ma, Si) were computed. The 
Wiener and Harmon (1946) subtle and obvious subscales on the 
Q, !!Y, Pd, Pa, and Ma scales were also calculated. Only the 
first 370 items of the MMPI-2 are needed to score the above 
scales. 
The MMPI-2 items are protected by copyright laws and 
were presented with permission by the University of 
Minnesota. Items were displayed on a 9-inch green screen 
monitor controlled by an IBM-compatible computer and BASIC 
program. The computer also recorded true/false responses 
and gathered response latencies. Subjects were familiarized 
with the computer, and a sample item was presented. They 
were told to press "1" for "true" or "mostly true" responses 
and "2" for "false" or "mostly false" responses. They were 
then required to respond to the sample item: "I like to walk 
my dog." Then the test items were administered. A second 
BASIC program computed ~-scores for each of the 370 items by 
subtracting the item's mean latency, obtained from responses 
to items when subjects were instructed to respond honestly, 
and dividing the result by the corresponding standard 
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deviation. The same procedure was utilized for all the 
items in this study. The program further adjusted for 
outliers by converting latencies less than ls to ls. 
Latencies greater than 20s were reduced to 20s. The number 
of adjusted low scores and number of adjusted high scores 
were computed for each subject. According to Brunetti 
(1994), cutting scores below ls and above 20s affect one 
percent of the total latency scores. The program also 
calculated validity, clinical, and subtle-obvious T-scores 
and mean z-scores for each scale. In addition, mean 
response latency z-scores were calculated for accepted 
items, rejected items, and total (accepted plus rejected) 
items on each of the validity, clinical, and subtle-obvious 
scales. 
Procedure 
All subjects took the MMP.I-2 individually. Each 
subject took the test three times: with standard 
instructions, with fake~good instructions, and with fake-bad 
instructions. Even though taking the test more than once 
will drastically affect latencies for subsequently 
administered tests, the within-subject design was a more 
efficient way to utilize available subjects. Order effects 
were controlled for by completely counter-balancing the 
order of administration (i.e., each of the six possible 
combinations of instructional sets was equally represented 
for elevated and non-elevated groups). 
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Complete confidentiality was assured by keeping the 
identity of the subjects separate from their MMPI-2 
responses. Each subject was assigned a number to be entered 
into the computer. The information linking this number to a 
name was safely locked away while the experiment ran, and 
destroyed upon completion of data collection. 
Upon arrival, subjects read and signed an informed 
consent statement (see Appendix D). Inventory items were 
presented individually on the computer monitor and subjects 
were told to press the space bar after responding to each 
item, thus advancing them to the next item. Only "true" and 
"false" answers were permitted ( "1" = "true," "2" = 
"false") due to the recording of response latencies. 
Brunetti (1994) concluded that because no comparisons were 
made to paper-and-pencil administered inventories, omission 
of the "cannot say" response, and subjects' ability to 
review their responses, was not problematic. 
Due to the possibility that some subjects may not take 
the test in a serious fashion or may for one reason or 
another experience time pressure, the following exclusion 
criteria were applied to all subjects during all three 
conditions; if a subject responded too quickly to 50 or more 
items in any one condition, s/he was excluded from the study 
(the number was decided upon after perusal of the T-scores 
of "too quick" test-takers revealed an apparent randomness 
of responding). Any item's response latency of less than 
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.OSs was deemed "too quickly" (the BASIC program discussed 
above automatically tabulates this number). 
Subjects received instructional sets congruent with the 
group and order of condition to which they had been 
assigned. The instructional sets were identical to those 
used by Brunetti (1994) and were presented to the subjects 
on the computer screen prior to each inventory 
administration. When taking the test honestly, subjects 
received the following instructions: 
I am interested in the characteristics of the 
student body at this college and I want you to 
take a personality test for me. Because I am 
interested in group characteristics I do not 
want you to enter your name with your responses. 
Do, however, accurately record your gender. 
In short, I want you to take this test in an 
honest but anonymous fashion. (p. 41). 
When faking bad, subjects received these instructions: 
I want you to imagine a situation in which you 
are being cast in an adversary relationship 
against a psychologist. More specifically, 
imagine a situation in which it would be to your 
advantage to appear as if you were mentally 
disturbed. Examples of such a situation could 
be: applying for rehabilitation services, trying 
to qualify for disability benefits, or trying 
to beat a legal charge on grounds of insanity. 
In short, I want you to take this test and 
deliberately fake bad, so that your deception 
could not be detected by a professional 
psychologist. (p. 42) 
When faking good, subjects received these instructions: 
I want you to imagine a situation in which you 
are being cast in an adversary relationship 
against a psychologist. More specifically, 
imagine a situation in which it would be to your 
advantage to appear as if you were completely 
normal and sane. Examples of such a situation 
could be: trying to secure an early release from 
prison, trying to secure a release from a mental 
hospital, or applying for a good job. In short, 
I want you to take this test and deliberately fake 
good, so that your deception could not be detected 
by a professional psychologist. (p~ 43) 
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Subsequent to the completion of the MMPI-2, all 
subjects were debriefed on the nature and objectives of the 
study. All subjects were further told that if they found 
any of the items on the MMPI-2 to be upsetting and/or if 
they felt they had some personal problems they would like to 
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discuss with someone, there are facilities on campus that 
provide psychological services. Written information about 




MMPI-2 T-score Findings 
To test hypotheses 1, 2, and- 3 predicting T-score 
differences between groups and within conditions, an overall 
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was run. 
Independent variables were group (elevated versus 
nonelevated) and condition (honest, fake-good, fake-bad). 
T-scores on the 13 basic scales served as dependent 
measures. Using the Wilk's Lambda.criterion, results 
revealed a significant overall group effect, E{13,34) = 
2.68, 2 < .01, a significant condition effect, E(26,160) ~ 
46.80, 2 < .0001, and a group by condition interaction 
effect, E(26,160) = 2.64, 2 < .0001. Univariate analyses 
were performed, and error terms (pooled error terms were 
used when paired samples' i-tests were to be performed) from 
these analyses were used in subsequent i-tests. Hypothesis 1 
predicted differences between the elevated and nonelevated 
groups in the honest condition on 8 clinical scales as well 
as the E scale. Student's i-tests (one-tailed for scales E, 
1-4, and 6-9, and two-tailed for scales 1, K, 5, and 0) 
showed that subjects in the elevated group scored 
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significantly higher than subjects in the nonelevated group 
on all MMPI-2 basic scales but 1, ~, and Mf when taking the 
test honestly. Further, subjects in the elevated group 
scored significantly lower than subjects in the nonelevated 
group on the~ scale when taking the test honestly. 
Hypothesis 2 predicted differences between the elevated 
and the nonelevated groups in the fake-good and fake-bad 
conditions. The results of two-tailed t-tests revealed only 
two significant differences for the fake-bad condition. 
Subjects in the nonelevated group had higher ~-scores than 
subjects in the elevated group on the Pa as well as the Si 
scales. Detailed information about means and differences 
among means are provided in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Mean K-corrected T-scores by Group and Condition 
Condition 
Dep.Var. Group Honest F-G 
L Elevated 44.92a 74.21b 
Nonelevated 46.38a 78.88b 
F Elevated 63.88 1a 48.46b 
Nonelevated 49.00 2a 46.42a 
K Elevated 41.38 1a 57.63b 
Nonelevated 47 .sa2a 62.21b 
Hs Elevated 55.88 1a 50.33a 











Table 1 /contd. 
Condition 
Dep.Var. Group Honest F-G F-B 
D Elevated 52. 71 1a 46.5ob 82.04c 
Nonelevated 43.582a 43.42a 86.29b 
Hy Elevated 51.63 1a 47.88a 78.67b 
Nonelevated 43.382a 49.29a 80.79b 
Pd Elevated 56.67 1a 47.83b 87.71c 
Nonelevated 44.962a 45.21a 92.75b 
Mf Elevated 55.92a 55.67a 69.96b 
Nonelevated 51.71a 56.58b 70.21c 
Pa Elevated 52.83 1a 49.79a 109. 75lb 
Nonelevated 45.92 2a 49.58a 116.332b 
Pt Elevated 59. 04la 48.46b 89.04c 
Nonelevated 46.132a 46.42a 93.04b 
Sc Elevated 64.33 1a 51.13b 114.29c 
Nonelevated 43.792a 47.79a 119.29b 
Ma Elevated 67. 67 1a 52.42b 85 o 71 C 
Nonelevated 49.75 2a 50.71a 84.83b 
Si Elevated 49.83 1a 40.71b 68.83 1c 
Nonelevated 44.42 2a 38.Q8b 75.73 2c 
Note. Different numbers on the same vertical line denote 
significant differences between the elevated and the 
nonelevated group using Student's :!;.-statistic (df = 138, 
2 <.05). Different letters on the same horizontal line 
denote significant differences between conditions using 
Student's :!;.-statistic (df = 92, 2 < .02). 
To test hypothesis 3, Student's :!;.-tests were performed 
on within-group T-score differences for both the elevated 
and the nonelevated groups. Subjects in both groups were 
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expected to produce lower T-scores when faking good and 
higher T-scores when faking bad on the E scale and clinical 
scale 1-4 and 6-9, with the opposite pattern expected for 
the 1 scale. One-tailed 1-tests were performed on all 
predicted differences, whereas two-tailed 1-tests were 
utilized when testing differences on scales I, Mf, and Si. 
Because comparisons were made among three means (i.e., 
honest, fake-good, and fake-bad), the family-wise error rate 
was controlled (i.e., .05 was divided by 3). For the 
elevated group, subjects scored higher when faking bad than 
when they took the test honestly or faked good on all basic 
scales but·~ and I• On scales 1 and I, subjects scored 
higher when faking good as comp~~ed to both the honest and 
the fake-bad condition. Significant differences between the 
honest and the fake-good conditions were also found on 
several clinical scales, including Q, Pd, Pt, Sc, Ma, and 
Si. On all of these scales, subjects scored higher when 
responding honestly than when faking good (see Table 1). 
For the nonelevated grotip, Student's 1-tests revealed 
subjects scored higher when they were faking bad than when 
taking the test honestly or faking good on all basic scales 
but 1 and I• Further, the nonelevated subjects scored 
higher when faking good than when taking the test honestly 
or faking bad on both the 1 and the I scales (these results 
closely mirror the results for the elevated group). Other 
differences between the honest and the fake-good conditions 
46 
for the nonelevated group were that subjects scored higher 
when faking good than when responding honestly on the Mf 
scale with the opposite found for the Si scale (see 
Table 1). No other clinical scale differences were found. 
MMPI-2 Response Latency Findings 
Subsequent to the analyses of T-scores, the main 
analyses exploring response latency differences were 
undertaken (hypotheses a and b). First, latencies for 
accepted items on the MMPI-2 basic scales were investigated, 
followed by investigation of rejected items' response 
latencies, and total items' response latencies. Thus, three 
overall MANOVA's were run. Independent variables were group 
(elevated/nonelevated) and condition (honest/fake-good/ 
fake-bad). For the first MANOVA, the dependent variables 
were accepted items' latencies for the 13 basic scales. 
Using Wilk's Lambda criterio"n, this 2 (group) X 3 
(condition) MANOVA revealed a significant overall effect for 
condition only, f(26,160) = 2.88, 2 < .0002. The second 
MANOVA utilized the rejected items' latencies for the 13 
basic scales as dependent variables, revealing an overall 
condition effect only, f(26,160) = 4.05, 2 < .0001. 
Finally, an overall condition effect was also found for 
the 13 basic scales' total latencies (f(26,l60) = 3.62, 
2 < .0001). 
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Thus, all three of the overall MANOVA latency analyses 
revealed condition main effects only. Several other studies 
have documented the response latency effects of instructing 
subjects to fake (e.g., Brunetti, 1994). Further, 
between-group differences were of major interest in this 
study, and no hypotheses were proposed as to what the 
within-group differences might be. Thus, pairwise 
comparisons using the Neuman-Keuls' procedure were used if a 
significant condition effect was also found in the 
subsequent univariate analysis. Results from these analyses 
will be presented after those involving hypothesized 
differences. 
The first major question of this study relates to 
hypotheses a and b. Briefly restated, do individuals with 
elevated scores respond differently than individuals with no 
MMPI-2 scale elevations in terms of their latencies when 
answering personality inventory items? Student's t-tests 
were performed for each condition (i.e., honest, fake-good, 
and fake-bad; error terms were drawn from univariate 
analyses). In order to control for the family-wise error 
rate when making comparisons between groups at each level of 
instruction, the significance level was set at .02 (i.e., 
.05 was divided by 3), thus treating the different types of 
latencies (i.e., accepted, rejected, and total) as a family. 
When testing for response latency differences between 
subjects with elevated MMPI-2 scores and subjects with no 
elevations on clinical scales in the honest condition 
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(hypothesis a), student's t-tests (one-tailed for all scales 
but Mf and Si) revealed no significant differences for 
accepted items. For the fake-good condition, t-tests 
(two-tailed) indicated subjects in the elevated group 
responded significantly slower than subjects in the 
nonelevated group when accepting items on the Q scale (see 
Table 2). No significant differences were found for 
accepted items in the fake-bad condition. 
Table 2 
Mean Response Latency Z-scores for Accepted 
Items by Group and 'condition 
Condition 
Dep. Var. Group Honest F-G F-B 
L Elevated .13 .16 .78 
Nonelevated .25 -.04 .78 
F Elevated .34 .61 .39 
Nonelevated .29 .07 -.15 
K Elevated .08 .02 .08 
Nonelevated -.10 -.29 -.18 
- Hs Elevated .16 .02 .32 
Nonelevated .oo -.26 -.19 
D Elevated .11 .15 1 .16 
Nonelevated -.10 -.31 2 -.19 
Hy Elevated • 11 .12 .20 
Nonelevated -.03 -.23 -.20 
Table 2 /contd. 
Condition 
Dep. Var. Group Honest F-G F-B 
Pd Elevated .05 .25 .00 
Nonelevated -.03 .01 -.18 
Mf Elevated .08 .14 .28 
Nonelevated -.02 -.22 -.19 
Pa Elevated .11 .18 .08 
Nonelevated .02 -.27 -.26 
Pt Elevated .13 .24 .08 
Nonelevated -.06 .06 -.34 
Sc Elevated .18 .18 .13 
Nonelevated .10 -.16 -.25 
Ma Elevated .05 -.02 .05 
Nonelevated -.07 -.16 -.37 
Si Elevated .10 .18 .11 
Nonelevated -.03 -.17 -.20 
Note. Different numbers on the same vertical line denote 
significant differences using Student's t-statistic for 
differences among means (df = 138, 2 < .02). 
The next series of student's t-tests for differences 
among means involved the rejected items. No significant 
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between-group differences were found in either the honest or 
the fake-good conditions. For the fake-bad condition, 
subjects in the elevated groups rejected items significantly 
50 
more slowly than subjects in the nonelevated group on scales 
f, K, Q, Pa, and Sc (see Table 3). 
Table 3 
Mean Response Latency Z-scores for Rejected 
Items by Group and Condition 
Condition 
Dep. Var. Group Honest F-G F-B 
L Elevated .05 .45 .40 
Nonelevated -.04 .23 -.11 
F Elevated .08 .11 .45 1 
Nonelevated -.15 -.21 - • 01 2 
K Elevated .06 .22 .00 1 
Nonelevated -.02 -.16 -.37 2 
Hs Elevated .13 .oo .23 
Nonelevated .· -.13 -.32 -.10 
D Elevated . 12 .00 .19 1 
Nonelevated -.12 -.27 -.282 
Hy Elevated .08 .03 .18 
Nonelevated -.11 -.29 -.17 
Pd Elevated .04 .01 .15 
Nonelevated -.07 -.16 .00 
Mf Elevated .03 .20 .29 
Nonelevated -.04 -.19 -.14 
Pa Elevated .08 .09 .19 1 
Nonelevated -.11 -.18 -.302 
Pt Elevated .08 -.02 .05 
Nonelevated -.13 -.34 .08 
Table 3 /contd. 
Condition 
Dep. Var. Group Honest F-G 
Sc Elevated .10 -.03 
Nonelevated -.15 -.30 
Ma Elevated .09 -.01 
Nonelevated -.08 -.29 
Si Elevated .06 .06 
Nonelevated -.09 -.25 
Note. Different numbers on the same vertical line 
denote significant differences using Student's 
1-statistic for differences among means (df = 138, 








For total latencies, two-tailed 1-tests revealed no 
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significant between-group differences in either the honest 
or the fake-good conditions. When subjects were instructed 
to fake-bad, subjects in the elevated group responded slower 
than subjects in the nonelevated group to items on s6~les [, 
~, and Hs (see Table 4). 
In order to test the importance of face validity of 
items in response latency research, the MMPI-2 subtle and 
obvious subscalelatency scores were included as part of the 
main analyses (hypotheses a, b, and c). Six additional 
MANOVA's were performed using the Wilk's Lambda criterion. 
The dependent variables were subtle and obvious subscales' 
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Table 4 
Mean Response Latency Z-scores for Total 
Items by Group and Condition 
Condition 
Dep. Var. Group Honest F-G F-B 
L Elevated .03 .38 .44 
Nonelevated -.03 .05 .02 
F Elevated .10 • 14 .36 1 
Nonelevated -.12 -.21 -.13 2 
K Elevated .06 .08 .09 1 
Nonelevated -.07 -.25 - • 332 
Hs Elevated .12 .00 .25 1 
Nonelevated -.12 -.35 -.19 2 
D Elevated .10 .05 .18 
Nonelevated -.11 -.28 -.23 
Hy Elevated .08 .05 .19 
Nonelevated -.09 -.28 -.20 
Pd Elevated .04 .07 .05 
Nonelevated -.05 -.11 -.15 
Mf Elevated .05 .19 .28 
Nonelevated -.05 -.22 -.16 
Pa Elevated .09 . 12 .11 
Nonelevated -.09 -.20 -.27 
Pt Elevated .08 .00 .08 
Nonelevated -.10 -.31 -.30 
Sc Elevated .12 .00 .15 
Nonelevated -.13 -.29 -.23 
Ma Elevated .05 -.02 .05 
Nonelevated -.07 -.25 -.31 













Note. Different numbers on the same vertical line 
denote significant differences using Student's 
1-statistic for differences among means (df = 138, 




accepted, rejected, and total latencies. For the obvious 
subscale, accepted latencies, the 2 (group) X 3 
(instructional condition) design revealed a significant 
interaction effect, f(l0,176) = 2.06, 12 < .03. Using the 
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accepted latencies on the subtle subscales as the dependent 
measures, a significant main effect for condition, f(l0,176) 
= 2.20,· 12 < .02 was found. For the rejected latencies on 
the obvious subscales, no overall effects were detected. 
Using the rejected latencies on the subtle subscales, 
however, an overall condition effect was found, f(l0,176) = 
2.06, 12 < .03. An overall condition effect was also found 
for obvious subscale total latencies, f(l0,176) = 1.93, 12 < 
.04. No significant, overall effects were found for subtle 
subscale total latencies. 
To test for hypothesized between-group differences, 
Student's 1-tests using the .02 level (.05/3) of 
54 
significance were performed. When accepting items in the 
honest condition, no significant differences were found 
between subjects in the elevated versus those in the 
nonelevated groups on either subtle (two-tailed) or obvious 
(one-tailed) subscales. Means are reported in Appendix A. 
Elevated subjects were slower to accept 
psychopathology-related items when faking good than 
nonelevated subjects on the Q and Pa obvious subscales. 
Mean £-scores for the elevated and the non-elevated groups 
on the Q scale were .20 and -.36, respectively. On the Pa 
scale, the mean £-scores were .38 for the elevated group and 
-.26 for the non-elevated group. No other significant 
differences were found for subtle or obvious scale accepted 
items. 
For subscale rejected latencies in the fake-bad 
condition, subjects in the elevated group (mean £-score 
= .39) responded more slowly than subjects in the 
nonelevated group (mean £-score= -.13) on the Q obvious 
subscale. For further perusal of these means, see Appendix 
B. No other significant differences were found for subtle 
or obvious scale rejected items. For total subscale 
latencies, only the fake-bad condition revealed significant 
group differences. Subjects in the elevated group responded 
more slowly than subjects in the nonelevated group to items 
on the Q and !!Y obvious subscales. For the Q subscale, mean 
£-scores were .19 and -.21 for elevated and non-elevated 
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groups, respectively. For the HY subscale, mean ~-scores 
were .26 and -.19 for the elevated and non-elevated groups, 
respectively. vMean ~-scores are also presented in 
Appendix C. 
The third major hypothesis (hypothesis c) in this study 
sought to explore the response latency differences between 
scales that were elevated and those that were not for the 
elevated group. The expectations were that, when responding 
honestly, subjects in the elevated group would accept items 
more quickly and reject items more slowly on those MMPI-2 
scales which are elevated compared to those scales which are 
not.·student's t_-tests were performed to test for 
differences among the means (i.e., elevated scale latencies 
versus nonelevated scale latencies). Latencies for clinical 
scales 1-4 and 6-9, subtle subscales, and obvious subscales 
were analyzed separately. Latency analyses were performed 
for accepted and rejected items (one-tailed for clinical 
scales and obvious subscales, two-tailed for subtle 
subscales and total items. Of the nine t_-tests performed, 
none was significant (see Table 5). 
Analyses of responses to accepted versus rejected 
items were performed to determine whether each group 
followed the expected pattern of endorsement. Due to their 
psychopathology self-schema, the elevated groupwas expected 
(hypothesis a) to endorse psychopathology-related items more 
quickly, and reject psychopathology- related items more 
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slowly as compared to normals. Endorsement pattern 
differences in the faking conditions were also of 
experimental interest (hypothesis b). The independent 
Table 5 
Mean Z-Scores for Scales by Elevations 
in the Elevated Group 
Endorsement 
Group Scales Accepted Rejected Total 
Elevated Clinical Scales .07 .08 .05 
Nonelevated .12 .09 .09 
Elevated Obvious Scales .10 .16 .11 
Nonelevated .16 .10 .11 
Elevated Subtle Scales -.10 .11 -.04 
Nonelevated .07 .05 .04 
., 
Note. N and df varied for each analyses (n varied from 
11 to 24) . 
variables were group (i.e., elevated and nonelevated), and 
condition (honest, fake-good, and fake-bad). Student's 
~-tests, all two-tailed due to nondirectional and/or 
nonspecific hypotheses, were performed to test for latency 
difference between accepted and rejected items on each basic 
scale (dependent variables). Significance levels were set 
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at .01. Because only two types of latencies, accepted and 
rejected, were included in this comparison, .01 was decided 
upon as a more conservative alternative to .05. No 
significant differences were found between accepted and 
rejected basic scale latencies for the elevated group in the 
honest condition. For the nonelevated group in the honest 
condition, significant differences were found between basic 
scale accepted and rejected latencies on"scales Kand Sc. 
Subjects accepted psychopathology-related items more slowly 
than the items they rejected on both of these scales (see 
Table 6). 
Table 6 
Mean Basic Scale z-scores by Endorsement 
in the Honest Condition 
Endorsement 
Group Scale Accepted Rejected Difference 
Elevated 1 .13 .05 .08 
K .34 .08 .25 
!S .08 .06 .01 
Hs .16 .13 .03 
.Q .11 .12 .oo 
!!Y .11 .08 .03 
Pd .05 .04 .01 
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Table 6 /contd. 
Endorsement 
Group Scale Accepted Rejected Difference 
Mf .08 .03 .05 
Pa .11 .08 .03 
Pt .13 .08 .05 
Sc .18 .10 .08 
Ma .05 .09 -.05 
Si .10 .06 .04 
Nonelevated ~ .25 -.04 .30 
.r .29 -.15 .43* 
li -.10 -.02 -.08 
Hs .oo -.13 .13 
12, -.10 -.12 .03 
HY -.03 -.11 .08 
Pd -.03 -.07 .04 
Mf -.02 -.04 .02 
Pa .02 -.11 .13 
Pt -.06 -.13 .07 
Sc .10 . - .15 .25* 
Ma -.07 -.08 .01 
Si -.03 -.09 .06* 
2. < .01, df = 92 
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In the fake-good condition, subjects with elevations 
accepted Pt scale items significantly more slowly than those 
items they rejected. For subjects in the nonelevated group, 
a similar pattern was found between accepted and rejected 
items on scales Pd, Pt, and Ma (i.e., items were signi-
ficantly more slowly accepted than rejected; see Table 7). 
Table 7 
Mean Basic Scale Z-scores by Endorsement 
in the Fake-Good Condition 
Endorsement 
Group Scale Accepted Rejected 
Elevated 1 .16 .45 
:[ .61 .11 
.K .02 .22 
Hs .02 .00 
Q .15 .00 
!!Y .12 .03 
Pd .25 .01 
Mf .14 .20 
Pa .18 .09 
Pt .24 -.02 














Table 7 /contd. 
Endorsement 
Group Scale Accepted Rejected Difference 
Ma -.02 -.01 -.01 
Si .18 .06 . 12 
Nonelevated !:! -.04 .23 -.27 
r .07 -.21 .28 
.K -.29 -.16 -.13 
Hs -.26 -.32 .05 
Q -.31 -.27 -.04 
!!Y -.23 -.29 .07 
Pd .01 -.16 .17 
Mf -.22 -.19 -.03 
Pa -.27 -.18 -.09 
Pt .06 -.34 .40* 
Sc -.16 -.30 .14 
Ma -.16 -.29 .13* 
Si -.17 -.25 .08* 
2 < .01, df = 92. 
No significant differences were found between accepted 
and rejected items for the elevated group in the fake-bad 
condition. Subjects in the nonelevated group rejected items 
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more quickly and accepted items more slowly when faking bad 
on basic MMPI-2 scale 1· The opposite endorsement pattern 
was found for scales Pd, Pt, and Ma (i.e., subjects were 
quicker to accept and slower to reject psychopathology-
related items when faking bad; see Table 8). 
Table 8 
Mean Basic Scale Z-scores by Endorsement 
in the Fake-Bad Condition 
Endorsement 
Group Scale Accepted Rejected Difference 
Elevated 1 .78 .40 .38 
K .39 .45 -.06 
!S. .08 .08 -.01 
Hs .32 .23 .08 
Q .16 .19 -.03 
!!Y .20 .18 .02 
Pd .oo .15 -.15 
Mf .28 .29 -.01 
Pa .08 .19 -.11 
Pt .08 .05 .02 
Sc .13 .33 -.20 
Ma .05 .09 -.04 
Si .11 .11 .00 
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Table 8 /contd. 
Endorsement 
Group Scale Accepted Rejected Difference 
Nonelevated 1 .78 -.11 .89* 
I -.15 -.01 -.14 
!S. -.18 -.37 .19 
Hs -.19 -.10 -.08 
12 -.19 - .• 28 .09 
!!Y -.20 -.17 -.03 
Pd -.18 .oo -.18* 
Mf -.19 -.14 -.05 
Pa -.26 -.30 .03 
Pt -.34 .08 -.42* 
Sc -.25 -.20 -.06 
Ma -.37 -.18 -.20* 
Si -.20 . -.21 .oo* 
12 < • 01, df = 92. 
This final section of results will address within-group 
differences. Post-hoc tests were only performed if the 
overall MANOVA and the subsequent univariate analysis 
suggested a condition effect or a condition by group 
interaction. When condition effects only were present, 
group means (i.e., elevated and nonelevated) were combined 
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and analyzed~ Pairwise comparisons using the Neuman-Keuls' 
procedure then compared mean differences among the three 
conditions (i.e., honest, fake-good, and fake-bad). As 
reported previously, overall conditio.n effects were found 
only for basic scale accepted, rejected and total latencies, 
for obvious subscale total latencies, and for subtle 
subscale accepted and rejected latencies. Univariate tests 
revealed significant condition effects for all the scales in 
question. Neuman-Keuls' tests revealed significant results 
for accepted latencies on lJ the L scale (subjects accepted 
items more slowly when faking bad, mean ~-score= .78, than 
when responding either honestly, mean ~-score= .19, or 
faking good, mean ~-score = • 06 )·, 2) the Pd scale ( subjects 
accepted items more quickly when faking bad, mean ~-score= 
-.09, than when faking good, mean ~-score= .13), 3) the Pt 
scale (subjects accepted items more quickly when faking bad, 
mean ~-score= -.13, than when faking good, mean ~-score= 
.15), and 4) the Pa subtle subscale (subjects accepted items 
more quickly when faking bad, mean ~-score= -.30, than when 
either faking good, mean ~-score= -.06, or responding 
honestly, mean ~-score= .04). The following significant 
differences. were found for the rejected latency within-group 
tests: 1) subjects rejected items more slowly on the [ scale 
when faking bad, mean ~-score= .22, than when faking good, 
mean ~-score= -.OS, or when taking the test honestly, mean 
~-score= -.03, and 2) subjects rejected items more slowly 
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when faking bad, mean ~-score= .08, than when faking good, 
mean ~-score= -.07, on the Pd scale (df = 92 for all the 
tests discussed above). 
One group by condition interaction was found during the 
overall latency analysis; obvious subscale accepted 
latencies revealed a significant interaction effect. Thus, 
condition effects were separately analyzed for each group. 
None of the univariate tests was significant for the 
elevated group. For the nonelevated group, subsequent to 
running the univariate tests, post-hoc pairwise comparisons 
revealed that subjects accepted items more slowly when 
responding honestly, mean ~-score= .23, than when faking 
good, mean ~-score= -.26, or when faking bad, mean ~-score 
= -.19, on the Pa obvious subscale (df = 92). 
CHAPTER V 
DISCUSSION 
Discussion of T-score Findings 
Before discussing the latency findings of this study, 
MMPI-2 basic T-score results will be briefly addressed. The 
first between-group effects that were expected were found 
(hypothesis l); subjects in the elevated group produced 
higher T-scores than subjects in the nonelevated group on 
the MMPI-2 ~ scale, and clinical scales 1-4 and 6-9. Even 
though no group differences were found between the elevated 
and nonelevated groups in the fake-good condition, the 
groups differed on scales Pa and Si when faking bad (i.e., 
nonelevated subjects scored higher on both scales). Thus, 
hypothesis 2 was only partially supported. These weaker 
between-group results for the faking conditions are not 
surprising in that so few studies have been conducted 
comparing the T-scores of subjects with scale elevations and 
subjects with no scale elevations under faking instructions. 
Thus, it appears that both groups produce similar T-scores 
when faking, at least when faking good. 
In regard to condition effects (hypothesis 3), the 
following predictions were supported: subjects in both the 
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elevated and the nonelevated groups produced higher 1-scale 
scores when faking good as compared to their honest 
responding. Further, subjects in the elevated group behaved 
according to expectations and produced lower T-scores when 
faking good compared to their honest responding on the K 
scale, and clinical scales .Q, Pd, Pt, Sc, Ma. However, no 
hypothesized clinical scale differences were detected for 
the nonelevated group when comparing mean T-scores for the 
honest and the fake-good conditions. This lack of clinical 
scale condition effect when comparing honest responding to 
faking good for the nonelevated subjects is not surprising. 
Several researchers have discussed what is called the 
"floor-effect" that normals experience when they are 
instructed to fake good (Brunetti, 1994; Peterson et al., 
1989). These researchers have found that honestly 
responding college students endorse so few psychopathology-
related items that, when asked to fake good, these profiles 
are very similar to their honest profiles. 
When faking bad, both elevated and nonelevated 
subjects, as hypothesized, produced higher T-scores as 
compared to their honest responding on the K scale, clinical 
scales 1-4, and 6-9. 
Overall, the three instructional sets presented to 
subjects each appeared effective. Subjects in both the 
elevated and the nonelevated groups behaved according to 
expectations when responding honestly, when faking good, and 
when faking bad. 
67 
Discussion of Response Latency Findings 
Results of the response latency analyses of this study 
showed that subjects with elevated MMPI - 2 profiles do not 
respond differently than subjects with normal profiles when 
responding honestly. Accepted, rejected, or total latency 
differences were not found between the elevated and the 
nonelevated groups on any of the MMPI-2 basic or 
subtle/obvious scales when the test was taken honestly. 
Thus, it appears that subjects in the elevated versus the 
nonelevated groups do not statistically differ from each 
other in terms of reaction times when taking the MMPI - 2 
with standard instructions. 
Results further revealed that, as hypothesized, 
subjects with elevated MMPI - 2 profiles respond differently 
than subjects with normal profiles when instructed to fake. 
Response latency differences between the groups were found 
for the faking conditions. For basic scale accepted 
latencies, one fake-good difference was found (i.e., on 
scale Q). For basic scale rejected latencies, five fake-bad 
differences were found (i.e., on scales E, K, Q, Pa, and 
Sc). For basic scale total latencies, three fake-bad 
differences were found (i.e., on scale E, K, and Hs). 
Subjects in the elevated group responded more slowly than 
subjects in the nonelevated group to items on all the scales 
where significant differences were found, regardless of 
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whether they were accepting or rejecting items. Actually, 
this tendency to respond slower was apparent for almost all 
scales in all conditions (including the honest condition). 
However, significance levels were only reached in the 
instances mentioned above. Keeping the discussion to 
significant results only, it appears that a psychopathology 
self-schema slows down the process of responding when 
adopting a faking schema. Because most of the between-group 
differences were found in the fake-bad condition, this 
slowing process appears particularly true when elevated 
subjects adopt a faking psychopathology schema in which they 
must exaggerate their problems. 
The elevated subjects' pattern of responding more 
slowly to all items regardless of whether items are rejected 
or accepted is in direct contradiction to recent theoretical 
postulates and empirical evidence (e.g., Holden et al., 
1992; Brunetti, 1994). These researchers found that when 
subjects are instructed to fake, they adopt a faking schema 
that is similar to a self-schema. In terms of response 
latencies, subjects proceed to endorse schema-relevant items 
more quickly and reject schema-relevant items more slowly 
both when faking and when responding honestly (i.e., 
subjects make a shift in schema when faking but the 
endorsement process remains the same). However, none of the 
previous empirical studies on inventory response latencies 
included clinical populations. Thus, current findings 
indicate that individuals with some psychopathology may 
behave more according to the theory of Rogers (1977), who 
maintains that accessing a schema prolongs the process of 
responding. 
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Further evidence that subjects with scale elevations do 
not follow the same endorsement pattern as normals comes 
from the analysis for the elevated subjects in the honest 
condition (hypothesis a). The expectation was that subjects 
preselected for psychopathology were to accept 
psychopathology-related items more quickly, and reject 
psychopathology-related items more slowly on scales that 
were elevated versus those that were not (Holden et al., 
1992). Thus, an important part of the main analysis of this 
study compared latencies for elevated scales to those with 
no elevations (accepted, rejected, and"total latencies were 
compared separately). No significant differences were 
revealed, suggesting latencies for elevated and nonelevated 
scales were essentially the same. Elevated subjects thus 
appear to respond with comparable speed to all inventory 
items when taking the test honestly. 
In order to obtain information about possible pattern 
differences between the elevated and nonelevated groups, 
basic scale accepted and rejected latencies were compared 
for each group. Only one significant difference was found 
for the elevated group (i.e., for the Pt scale in the 
fake-good condition). Again, this suggests that subjects in 
the elevated group respond with similar speed to accepted as 
well as rejected items. However, several significant 
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differences were found for the nonelevated group (i.e., for 
the land Sc scales in the honest condition, for the Pd, Pt, 
and Ma scales in the fake-good condition, and for the 1, Pd, 
Pt, and Ma scales in the fake-bad conditions). All 
significant differences followed the expected endorsement 
pattern found in previous response latency research (e.g., 
Holden & Popham, 1990; Holden et al., 1992; Brunetti, 1994). 
In the honest condition, accepting items on the land Sc 
scales took significantly longer than rejecting items. In 
the fake-good condition, accepting items on the Pd, Pt, and 
Ma scales also took significantly longer than rejecting 
items. In the fake-bad condition, accepting items took 
significantly longer on the 1 scale, but significantly 
shorter on the Pd, Pt, and Ma scales as compared to the 
rejected items. Thus, it appears that even though normals 
endorse items according to previously established 
expectations, both in honest and faking conditions, subjects 
with elevations do not respond according to this pattern. 
Turning to address the issue of face-validity of items 
when doing response latency research, current results 
revealed that the full scales, with both subtle and obvious 
items, are as good at predicting scale differences as either 
the obvious subscales or the subtle subscales. The 
subtle/obvious subscale response latency between-group 
analysis yielded five significant findings for the obvious 
subscales in the fake-good and the fake-bad conditions as 
compared to nine significant findings for the full scales. 
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Finally, the within-group differences found in this 
study were for the most part consistent with previous 
response latency findings (e.g., Holden & Popham, 1990; 
Holden et al., 1992; Brunetti, 1994) in terms of expected 
speed of endorsement. For example, subjects accepted~ 
scale items more-slowly when faking bad than when responding 
honestly or faking good. However, the sheer number of 
findings were few. The reason for this lack of significant 
results is uncertain. It is possible that results were 
influenced by having combined the elevated and nonelevated 
groups before analyzing the condition effects. 
Conclusions 
In conclusion, subjects with scale elevations appear to 
approach inventory item responding differently than normals 
in terms of their response latencies. At least when faking 
bad, they respond more slowly than normals regardless of 
whether they accept or reject items. Their process of 
responding does not appear to be affected by scale 
elevations, whether they decide to accept or reject an item, 
or whether the item is scored for psychopathology. For 
example; elevated subjects rejected~ scale as well as Sc 
scale items more slowly than nonelevated subjects when 
faking bad. Thus, after adjusting for item length, all 
items are answered with comparable speed. The subtlety of 
an item does not seem to interfere with this process, 
either. The response process of elevated subjects thus 
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appear consistent with Rogers' (1977) hypothesis stating 
that performing self-referenced tasks slows down the process 
of responding (schemas are elaborate and involve deeper 
processing) • 
The normal subjects in this study responded according 
to previously established latency expectations. They 
accepted items more quickly and rejected items more slowly 
on psychopathology- related scales when faking bad, with the 
opposite pattern found when faking good or responding 
honestly. Thus, the response process of nonelevated 
subjects appear consistent with Holden et al.'s (1992) 
position that individuals follow the pattern described above 
when accessing a self-schema or adopting a faking schema, 
depending on the instructions. 
Why individuals with elevations differ from normals in 
terms of the response latency process they utilize is at 
this point uncertain and purely speculative. Perhaps 
variables related to experiencing psychological difficulties 
(e.g., psychomotor retardation due to depression, anxiety, 
thought disturbances, etc.) slows down the process of 
responding. However, this does not explain why the pattern 
is different, only why latencies are slower. Further, 
responding was primarily found to be slower in the fake-bad 
condition. Perhaps being told to fake-bad triggers thoughts 
or feeling of their own difficulties, and they start to 
access their psychopathology self-schema. Attempting to 
differentiate between the self and the adopted identity may 
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require some additional efforts forcing expenditure of time. 
Turning to the apparent between-group process differences, 
the answers may be found by exploring what constitutes a 
self-schema and what does not. The self-schema may need to 
be something one identifies with strongly in order to have 
what Rogers (1977) called an elaborate framework. 
Individuals may utilize one pattern when a schema is sketchy 
and switch to a different pattern when a schema is more 
elaborate. 
When comparing latency differences to !-score 
differences, results from this study presented an 
interesting picture. When responding honestly, !-scores 
predicted group membership quite successfully, whereas no 
between-group response latency differences were detected. 
However, for the fake-bad condition, response latencies 
appeared a better predictor of group membership than 
!-scores. For future reference, one may thus be able to 
distinguish between a mentally healthy person who is faking 
bad and a disturbed person who is faking bad by looking at 
the speed and pattern of responding. Even more salient, one 
may also be able to distinguish between a severely disturbed 
person who is responding honestly and a disturbed person who 
is faking bad. This would be important information, 
particularly for clinicians working in settings were 
over-reporting is a common phenomena. In certain setting, 
for example, in VA populations, one can often observe a 
"ceiling effect" when administering the MMPI-2 (i.e., an 
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MMPI-2 profile where most of the psychopathology scales, 
including the E scale, are in the elevated ranges). In 
these settings, response latencies may eventually aid in the 
process of distinguishing over-reporters from acutely 
disturbed individuals. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
There are certain limitations to this study that could 
be improved in future research. First, a true clinical 
population was not utilized. Instead, college students were 
screened for psychopathology and then included as subjects 
in the elevated group only if their MMPI-2 scores were in 
the elevated ranges on any of the 8 clinical scales. The 
differences between college students with elevations versus 
those with no elevations are probably less than the 
differences found between normal and mental health 
populations. Further, the T-score differences between some 
of the subjects categorized as elevated and their 
nonelevated counterparts were only a point or two. A 
subject with a scaled T-score of 64 would be classified as 
nonelevated while another subject with a scaled T-score of 
65 would be classified as elevated. Thus, the two groups 
may be more homogenous on a mental health-illness dimension 
than preferred. In future studies, the utilization of true 
clinical populations, or extreme groups, should assure more 
between-group variability. 
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Another limitation to this study pertains to the 
possible confounding factor of fatigue for all participants. 
Even though the order of presentation was rigidly 
controlled, subjects were still required to take the MMPI-2 
three times. Further, the absolute latencies in this study 
are only generalizable to other college populations who have 
taken the MMPI-2 three times in a row. In future studies, 
MMPI-2 administrations should be limited to no more than 
two, and ideally just one per subject. 
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Note. Different numbers on the same vertical line denote 
significant differences using Student's ~-statistic for 
differences among means (df = 138, p < .02). 
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APPENDIX B 
MEAN SUBTLE/OBVIOUS RESPONSE LATENCY 
Z-SCORES FOR REJECTED ITEMS BY 
GROUP AND CONDITION. 
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Appendix B 
Mean Subtle/Obvious Response Latencv Z-scores for 
Rejected Items by Group and Condition 
Condition 
Dep. Var. Group Honest F-G 
.Q-Obvious Elevated .12 ..;, • 06 
Nonelevated -.15 -.26 
,!!y-Obvious Elevated .10 .00 
Nonelevated -.13 -.33 
Pd-Obvious Elevated .03 .00 
Nonelevated -.08 -.30 
Pa-Obvious Elevated .13 .14 
Nonelevated -.15 -.13 
Ma-Obvious Elevated .14 .03 
Nonelevated -.10 -.33 
.Q-Subtle Elevated .13 .30 
Nonelevated -.01 -.20 
,!!y-Subtle Elevated .04 .11 
Nonelevated -.02 -.20 
Pd-:-Subtle Elevated .07 .09 
Nonelevated -.12 -.15 
Pa-Subtle Elevated .03 .02 
Nonelevated -.08 -.29 
Ma-Subtle Elevated .10 -.08 
Nonelevated -.04 -.24 























significant differences using Student's 1-statistic for 
differences among means (df = 138, E < • 02) • 
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APPENDIX C 
MEAN SUBTLE/OBVIOUS RESPONSE LATENCY 
Z-SCORESFOR TOTAL ITEMS BY 
GROUP AND CONDITION 
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Appendix C 
Mean Subtle/Obvious Response Latency z-scores 
for Total Items by Group and Condition 
Dep. Var. Group Honest F-G 
.Q-Obvious Elevated .12 -.03 
Nonelevated -.13 -.26 
,!!y-Obvious Elevated .10 .02 
Nonelevated -.11 -.31 
Pd-Obvious Elevated .05 .05 
Nonelevated -.08 -.28 
Pa-Obvious Elevated .10 .18 
Nonelevated -.11 -.14 
Ma-Obvious Elevated .09 -.01 
Nonelevated -,..10 -.29 
.Q-Subtle Elevated .06 .18 
Nonelevated -.06 -.28 
,!!y-Subtle Elevated .03 .08 
Nonelevated -.05 -.22 
Pd-Subtle Elevated .04 .12 
Nonelevated -.06 -.16 
Pa-Subtle Elevated .06 .05 
Nonelevated -.07 -.28 
Ma-Subtle Elevated .03 -.03 
Nonelevated -.05 -.20 

























significant differepces using Student's i-statistic for 
differences among means (df = 138, 12 < • 02) • 
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INFORMED CONSENT STATEMENT 
Project Title: Schema theory and faking on the Minnesota 
Multiphasic Personality Inventory-2 
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Experimenters: Anne B. Scott, M. S. & Robert S. Schlottmann, 
Ph.D. 
I, (print name) hereby 
authorize and direct Anne B. Scott, M.S., and Robert S. 
Schlottmann, Ph.D., or assistants of their choosing, to 
perform the procedures listed here. 
A. Purpose: This study is designed to investigate different 
styles of responding on the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory-2 (MMPI-2). The MMPI-2 is a widely 
used, standardized personality test. The format of the 
MMPI-2 consists of several hundred true/false items, some of 
which may be personal in nature. 
B. Procedures: You will be asked to do the following: 
1. Read a set of instructions on using the computer 
and responding to the MMPI-2. 
2. Answer items on a short form of the MMPI-2 twice. 
3. Participate in a debriefing session at the end of 
the experiment. Your questions will be addressed 
at this time. Please note that no information 
gained from the MMPI-2 will be made available to you. 
C. Duration of Participation: Your participation will take 
from 2-3 hours. 
D. Confidentiality: Computer files of this experiment's data 
will be numerically coded. Your name will not be affixed to 
any of the MMPI-2 materials. Thus, your anonymity will be 
assured. 
E. Risks: The risks in this study are minimal and do not 
exceed those ordinarily encountered in daily life. Some 
people may find specific items on the MMPI-2 personal and/or 
intrusive, but they are part of routine psychological 
evaluation and testing. 
F. Benefits: Through your participation in this study you 
will be exposed to scientific psychological research. This 
may help you in understanding the procedures and methods of 
psychology. In addition, the results of this andsubsequent 
related studies may aid psychologists in understanding 
responses on the MMPI-2. You will also be awarded extra 
credit points for your participation. 
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G. Compensation: You will be awarded 1 extra credit point in 
your PSYCH 1113 (Introductory Psychology) class for each 
hour or fraction of an hour you choose to participate in 
this experiment (Max=2); there are other ways that you can 
get extra credit in your class. You can be involved in 
other experiments and/or complete projects (e.g., book 
reports) which your instructor will explain. 
I have been fully informed about the procedures listed here. 
I am aware of what I will be asked to do and of the risks 
and benefits in this study. I also understand the following 
statements: 
I certify that I am at least 18 years of age. 
My participation today is part of an investigation called 
Schema Theory and Faking on the Minnesota Multiphasic 
Personality Inventory-2. 
The purpose of this study is to investigate different styles 
of responding on the MMPI-2. 
I understand that my participation is voluntary, that there 
is no penalty for refusal to participate, and that I am free 
to withdraw my consent and participation at any time without 
penalty. 
I understand that the research is being conducted by Anne B. 
Scott, M.S., under the supervision of Robert S. Schlottmann, 
Ph.D., in association with the Oklahoma State University 
Department of Psychology. 
I understand that I may contact either Anne B. Scott, M.S., 
at 405/744-6027, Robert S. Schlottmann, Ph.D., at 
405/744-6567, or Ms. Jennifer Moore at the Oklahoma State 
University Research Services, 005 Life Sciences East, 
Stillwater, OK 74078; 405/744-5700 if I wish further 
information regarding this research. 
I have read and fully understand the information contained 
in this form as presented to me. I sign it freely and 
voluntarily. 
Signature of Subject Date 
I certify that I have personally explained all areas of this 
form prior to the subject signing it. 
Signature of Researcher Date 
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